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✉ E-mail: manuel.alvarez@ltu.seAbstract: Under the present European directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, distribution
companies are not allowed to own distributed generation (DG) but encouraged to include it as a planning option to defer
investment in traditional grid reinforcements. Distribution system operators (DSOs) have used the provision of capacity
contracted to DG as a viable alternative under current regulatory arrangements. Here, the topics bonding DSOs and DG
owners under the present regulation will be explored and a planning structure that considers distribution capacity
contracts as a planning option will be proposed. This will serve as a road map for DSOs to implement its preferred
planning tools in an optimisation context, considering costs of investment, reliability, operation, and capacity provision
while complying with current regulation.1 Introduction
The growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DER)
represents a challenge for the distribution system operator (DSO)
regarding the adequacy of the grid to host it, and the management
of operational issues affecting the quality of service. As
established by the European Directive [1], the unbundling of the
distribution company from other non-related activity as generation
forbids the distribution company to own DG which is not intended
to provide network services. The DSO has to accept DG in the
same way as they have to accept changes in consumption. The
behaviour of DG is uncertain and hinders the DSO’s ability to
perform appropriate control and adequation of the grid [2]. DG
can help reduce investment in connection to the transmission grid
and can naturally defer investments in grid reinforcements. DG
located near demand can reduce network losses and provide
ancillary services to the DSO [3]. High penetration of DG can
increase the reinforcement costs to allow its connection to the grid
and increase network losses due to reverse power ﬂows. This can
result in higher capital expenditure for the DSO, and if not
socialised among the customers, it can have a negative impact on
its revenue [4]. Unbundling rules, in spite of these shortcomings,
make sense regarding competition issues related to grid access and
connection. Since the DSO cannot directly inﬂuence either the
location or the operation of DG, this conﬂict might be overcome
by giving ﬁnancial incentives to inﬂuence the DG operators to
settle in a particular location and behave in response to DSO
needs [3]. Some works have addressed the issues that hinder the
DG integration [5] and some recommendations have been
proposed in order to adapt the present regulation according to this
[6]. In the absence of unbundling rules, due to lack of investors in
DG or when competition at retail level is not promoted, DG can
be considered as a planning option that can be installed and
operated by the DSO [7]. In the presence of unbundling, some
methodologies address load shaving strategies implementing DG
[8] and others the investment deferral through capacity contracts.
A market-oriented approach called contract for deferral scheme
allows the DSO to contract capacity from a portfolio of availableCIRED, Open Access Proc. J., 2017, Vol. 2017, Iss. 1, pp. 2869–2873
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distributed generation [10] allows the DSO to convene an auction
in areas with capacity shortage, letting the DG within those areas
to bid a ﬁrm capacity.
There is still a lack of planning methodologies that match closer
the actual regulation in Europe while trying to include DG in it.
This work will propose a structure to adapt capacity procure
mechanisms or distribution capacity contracts (DCCs), into the
distribution grid planning methodology.
The remainder of this article is divided as follows: the next section
will provide a description of the DSOs. Then, the planning problem
including DG will be explained further. A planning structure
including DCCs will be proposed. Finally, conclusions and
recommendations will be presented at the end of this paper.2 Distribution system operators
The DSOs are responsible for managing, controlling, and planning
the future distribution systems. From a technical viewpoint, the
operation of the distribution system concerns two critical aspects:
control of the voltage variations and the management of the
congestions. When DG production exceeds local demand, system
overvoltage and congestion may occur. DSOs have to comply with
their responsibilities [11], which are: development of the system,
connection and provision of capacity, monitoring and control to
provide operational security, balancing and congestion
management, and to guarantee the availability and quality of
service. Other important role of the DSO in some EU countries is
to serve as an impartial facilitator in the retail market activity
through managing metering, providing information to market
participants and helping in the process of switching supplier.
DSOs might serve as an information hub that gathers and
distributes data to the stakeholders connected to it, providing
efﬁcient access to the system and granting conﬁdentiality among
participants [12]. Some examples of implemented information
hubs are the NUBIX model in Norway and the EMIX portal in
Sweden. These information platforms could help enhance2869Commons
communication and facilitate the trade of services to boost system
operation.2.1 DSO current situation
Given the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the
DSOs, an incentive-based regulation that promotes efﬁciency has
been implemented by most European countries [13]. The DSO is
obliged to provide connection to any new user including DG.
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) are increased to adapt the grid for
hosting the DG implementing reinforcements as transformers,
lines, and switchgear. Operational expenditures (OPEX) are
increased since network losses tend to increase when high density
of DG is present, and to manage the inherent complexity in
control, automation, protection devices, power quality mitigating
devices, and maintenance. The DSO, being a part of a vertically
integrated undertaking, must remain independent from other
activities not related to distribution. This avoids the DSO
favouring a generation business owned by the same undertaking,
also avoiding the ability to perform a joint network and generation
planning. As a consequence, DSOs are disregarding DG and their
advantages leading to inefﬁcient planning and operation of the
system [14].2.2 DSO remuneration
In the traditional revenue structure of the distribution company, the
money ﬂows from the customers, either DG or consumers, to the
service providers. According to [15] (Fig. 1), the revenues are
divided in connection charges and use of service (UoS) charges.
Connection charges are paid once and are intended to cover either
the direct cost of connection to the distribution grid (shallow),
including upstream network reinforcements (shallowish charges),
or including equipment and reinforcements upstream the point of
connection (deep charges). This characterisation might change
from one country to another. The different types of connection
costs are further explained in [16]. In some of the EU member
states, a capacity threshold is deﬁned in order to apply one type of
connection charge or the other. The UoS is paid regularly by the
grid users and is a tariff based on the cost and proﬁt allowance set
by regulation. It guarantees the DSO recovery of costs and
facilitates DG integration. Other operational expenses as ancillary
services, reactive power support, balancing, and energy losses are
paid to the transmission system operator (TSO), DGs, and other
large power producers at transmission level. An overview of the
revenue structure in some of the EU countries is presented in [5].
Three typical distribution regulation approaches can be
distinguished:Fig. 1 DSO revenues and expenditures [15]
CI
2870 This is an openRate-of-return regulation: the regulator approves a proﬁt over the
audited expenses.
Incentive-based regulation: under a price-cap regulation, the
regulator sets a cap on the service price the utility is allowed to
charge. Under a revenue-cap regulation, the regulator adjusts the
allowed revenues for the utility.
Yardstick regulation: Is also a form of incentive-based model where
the revenue is deﬁned by comparing the DSO performance to
equivalent suppliers. This is similar to a revenue cap regulation
where benchmarking is used.2.3 Quality of service
The technical quality of service provision comprises two categories,
continuity of service and voltage quality. Regarding voltage quality
aspects, the European standard EN50160 establishes the
characteristics of the voltage proﬁle that should be met by the
DSOs [17]. Levels and issues associated with e.g. ﬂicker,
harmonics, dips, and over-voltages have been addressed in order
to guarantee proper conditions for the operation of the equipment
connected to the grid [18]. Regarding the continuity of service,
reliability indices are computed to measure the performance of the
system. Frequency and duration indices as system average
interruption duration index (SAIDI) and system average
interruption frequency index (SAIFI) are typically used for that
purpose [19]. DER being located closer to the load centres tends
to impact speciﬁc costumers rather than the overall group of
connected costumers, and so forth they have a minimum impact
on indices like SAIFI and SAIDI. Customer average interruption
duration and frequency indices become suitable for measuring the
real impact of DER on reliability [20]. Penalisations within the
regulatory scheme can be used to incentivise the DSO to keep
within margin those indices. The planning strategy might become
oriented to minimise the compromise between investment and
penalisations. A discussion on the tradeoffs between reliability
cost and beneﬁt in distribution planning is presented in [21]. The
penetration of DG impacts several operational aspects of the
distribution and transmission grid. The impact of DG penetration
is partially bonded to the protection system behaviour; also voltage
quality participates in undesirable scenarios that impact the
continuity of service [22]. The risk of overload is also impacted by
DG. It can reduce it by producing locally during peak hours, or it
can increase it by exporting to the transmission grid.
2.4 Uncertainties affecting the DSO
Conventionally, distribution planning consisted in identifying the
worst possible long-term future operating conditions, adding a
security margin, and reinforcing the grid accordingly. However, in
order to solve network problems close to real time (and thus
prevent or defer network investments), load/DG forecasts need to
be performed much more regularly and presumably with a higher
locational granularity. This is a challenge, especially concerning
DG production. The quality of the forecast depends on the time
horizon and the phenomena studied among other factors. Up to a
week, forecasts of temperature and wind might have an error
between 11 and 20%. For other phenomena like solar radiation or
forecasts for longer term horizons, the error percentage will grow
and other previsions based on scenarios evaluation must be taken.
Weather forecasting affects dynamic line rating, load and
production forecasting, failure rates of equipment, and reliability
indices used in planning studies [23]. These predictions allow the
DSO to evaluate strategies as network reconﬁguration, provision of
additional production, and demand response (DR). DR is also
correlated to weather behaviour due to heating, cooling, EV
charging, and renewable production such as rooftop photovoltaic
panels. DG owners also use predictions of market prices,
consumption, and weather affecting the renewable production in
order to deﬁne optimal operating strategies. Regulation is perhapsRED, Open Access Proc. J., 2017, Vol. 2017, Iss. 1, pp. 2869–2873
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one of the most abstract and difﬁcult to assess type of uncertainty.
Changes in the regulation can occur in the future, perturbing
already-made planning decisions.3 Planning with DG
Higher efﬁciencies are still on the side of large generators. DG
efﬁciencies have improved, given perfected technologies for fuel
conversion, and materials that reduce wear and maintenance.
Although the economy of scale favours large centrals, DG is
located closer to the customers, so the competition against large
generators is not only achieved in terms of efﬁciency or in terms
of cost per kWh: it is more economical if compared along with its
associated T&D requirements. Technical and economic aspects in
this regard can be found in [24]. How DG impacts the
performance of the power distribution grid and what possible
remedies can be implemented to ensure the quality of service have
been extensively treated in [22]. One of the key distribution
planning issues with DG is that they can trade energy in a
liberalised market while connected to an open access distribution
system that remains a regulated monopoly whose DSO is not
allowed to participate in the competition using it [25].3.1 Active management approach
The active management of the distribution grid enables the DSO to
make use of control variables located in the DG along with other
traditional control elements as transformer taps, reconﬁguration,
and voltage regulators. For instance, wind power cannot be easily
controlled but other DG as combined heat and power (CHP) or
biomass generators can be dispatched to meet ﬂuctuations. The
idea is to maximise the loadability of the circuits without affecting
the security and quality of the service. The DSO should foster the
installation of energy production and incentive production
according to network constraints. The DSO must act as a network
operator and a market facilitator that manages a local market for
network services. It is technical and economical inefﬁcient to track
load and renewable production fast changes at distribution level
with large base-load generators at transmission level. DG can be
equipped to provide such local balancing. A proposal for a
dynamic distribution system and market place presented in [26]
addresses the balancing between bulk generation and DERs. An
active management approach of the distribution system,
considering a scheduling framework at the TSO/DSO interface,
has been considered in [27].3.2 Regulation improvements
A report elaborated in [28] provides guidelines to improve the DG
integration in distribution grids. These guidelines are oriented to
socialise the impact of DG and to honour the proper payment of
service through tariffs and connection charges:
† an incentive-based regulation with UoS charges to DG,
differentiated by time of use and voltage level, along with
economic incentives for ancillary services provision;
† DSO compensation for increased CAPEX and OPEX due to a DG
penetration higher than 15–20%;
† performance-based regulation for quality of service targets;
† allow DG to pay and receive UoS charges;
† bilateral contracts between DGs and DSOs.
DSO compensation, through speciﬁc allowances and tariff
adjustments, has been studied in [29]. Also, a benchmark study to
evaluate the impact of different regulatory schemes was presented
in [30].CIRED, Open Access Proc. J., 2017, Vol. 2017, Iss. 1, pp. 2869–2873
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The DSO can implement new smart grid technologies and strategies
as alternative solutions in planning the distribution grid with
uncertainties. A structure to give the DSO a roadmap for
implementing such solutions while understanding its beneﬁts has
been proposed in [31]. Distribution planning that considers DG as
a planning option is supported by the assumption that the
regulation allows the DISCO to own generation and manage it.
Investment deferral [14] and peak cutting [8] are beneﬁts
perceived by the DSO if doing so. A proposed model considering
DG as non-wired solution for dynamic planning is presented in
[32]. Consideration of the reactive capability of DG in voltage
control has been studied in [33]. The impact of DG integration
along with load response uncertainty has been considered in [34].
A multi-stage planning methodology which considers the unit
commitment (UC) of generation units to assess the impact of new
DG in operational costs has been presented in [35]. A
multi-objective optimisation problem that captures simultaneously
the cost of the energy not served and the cost of the assets is
presented in [20].4 Planning with DCCs
The DCC creates a virtual communication channel between the DSO
and the DG owner when they enter into contract. This will let them
convene a strategy that favours the operation and planning of the
distribution grid in the lead time. The DCC comprises three stages:
a capacity call auction, the auction clearing and awarding, and the
DSO online power request. The DSO calls for auction at certain
locations in need of capacity provision. DG owners within those
areas place their bids composed by a single capacity at a certain
price. The DSO executes the auction clearing and awards the DG
owners the correspondent capacity contracts. Finally, the DG
owner will provide in the lead time, and upon request of the DSO,
at least a ﬁrm power within the capacity contracted. This will
allow the DSO to do ﬁne tuning of the grid during operation,
having a share of DG under its control. The DCC is applied under
the assumptions:
† The regulation allows this type of capacity contract.
† The DSO organises and calls capacity auctions. DR, storage
operators, renewable sources, and virtual power plants (VPPs) are
possible capacity providers.
4.1 Interaction between DG owners, DSOs, and DCCs
The willingness of the DG owner to participate in a DCC relies on
the improvement on its remuneration. A study assessing the impact
of DCCs on VPPs remuneration has been presented in [36]. The
bidding price and the penalties for non-compliance of the contract
are its main concerns. DCCs are expected to be applied by
distribution companies under an incentive-based regulation where
the revenues are limited and its application can increase DSO’s
proﬁtability. In a rate-of return scheme, the DSO can be more
interested in implementing traditional reinforcements if the rate set
by the regulator is high. The DSO has to consider maintenance
costs, network losses, and quality of supply while calculating
expansion costs.4.2 Planning structure
The DSO requires adapting the grid with regard to the regulatory
agreements, meeting design criteria, and exploiting DG beneﬁts to
ﬁnd cost-effective plans. Here, a planning structure (Fig. 2) is
proposed in order to introduce DCCs as a planning alternative that
should be considered within an optimisation framework to ﬁnd
short-term grid solutions. This planning methodology attempts to
determine if DCCs are a worthwhile option to defer grid investment.2871Commons
Fig. 2 Proposed planning structureThe main features of the proposed planning structure are:† This planning structure has been conceived for the short-term lead
time, between 1 and 3 years. This lead time is suitable for gearing,
DCCs, smart solutions, expansion, and operational decisions.
† The DSO gathers the data from the TSO/DSO interface,
customers, producers, and forecast their behaviour for the planning
lead-time.
† A balanced model for the grid might be used under the
assumption of proper load balancing in low voltage. Equipment to
mitigate unbalance can be considered within the connection charges.
† The planning problem can be formulated as a stochastic
multistage mixed integer linear programming problem. A manner
of considering the impact of early-stage decisions on future
operation and planning costs could be achieved by implementing a
stochastic dual dynamic programming approach [37].
† The award of the DCCs and their online power request are
decision variables.
† Reliability worth, investment, and operation costs are objectives
to be consider by the DSO.
† Considering an ex-post decision-making process, this
methodology intends to produce several expansion options to be
evaluated by a long-term plan study that will determine if they ﬁt
long-term needs and provide long-lasting value.
† The output of this short-term planning structure is a Pareto
front of investment and operation costs. This Pareto front could be
ﬁltered to reduce the spectra of non-dominated solutions as
explained in [38].5 Conclusions and recommendations
The regulation unbundling limits the communication between
stakeholders to avoid unethical strategies that jeopardise the
inherent fairness of the liberalised market. Certain trade of
information among actors could help reducing the predominant
uncertainty affecting the DSO in planning stages. There is a need
to improve communication between DSOs and DG owners in
order to reduce such uncertainty and improve the system
performance. The DCCs are expected to have two effects on
distribution systems: they will incentivise the development of
new capacity providers at speciﬁc locations, and they will give
the DSO an equivalent share of DG under its control. The
proposed planning methodology considers DCCs as part of the
available smart solutions. The methodology proposes to embed
the auction process to grant DCC contracts within the
optimisation framework in order to ﬁnd more cost-effective
combined solutions for a dynamic planning problem. The
optimisation algorithm contrasts DCCs against traditional
reinforcements. If worthwhile, DCCs could be chosen over grid
reinforcements. The planning methodology is a part of an ex-post
decision-making process whose output is a Pareto front of
investment and operational costs.CI
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